亨利-梅因：国际法Lecture 12

erate itself from the engagement of a treaty， nor modify the stipulations thereof， unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicab

le engagement.' It is true that this assertion of the virtual perpetuity of treaties （to which an exception must be introduced， save by the effect of war） contains a principle which is not without a danger of its own. But the receded principle is that which was laid down at the Conference. The truth is that an offender against the obligations of International Law is at present seriously weakened by the disapprobation he incurs. Nobody knew this better than Napoleon Bonaparte， who， next perhaps to Frederick the Great， was the most perfidious sovereign in modern history， when he persistently endeavoured through his official scribes to fasten on this country the name of 'perfidious Albion.'

　　But after all qualifications have been allowed， the denial to International Law of that auxiliary force which is commanded by all municipal law， and by every municipal tribunal， is a most lamentable disadvantage. The system owes to it every sort of infirmity. Its efficiency and its improvement are alike hindered. And in the last resort， when two or more disputant Powers have wrought themselves to such a heat of passion that they are determined to fight， the rest of the civilised world， though persuaded that the contest is unnecessary and persuaded that its contagion will spread， has， in the present state of international relations， no popover of forbidding or punish ing the armed attacks of one state on another. The great majority of those entitled to have an opinion may condemn the threatened war， but there is no officer of the Law of Nations to interfere with the headlong combatants. The amount of force which is at the disposal of what is called the commonwealth of nations collectively is immense and practically irresistible， but it is badly distributed and not well directed， and it is too often impotent， not only for the promotion of good， but for the prevention of acknowledged evil.

　　About six months ago， when an Association which has been formed for the codification of the Law of Nations （which I may describe parenthetically as most excellent undertaking） was holding its meetings， the subject attracted considerable， though only momentary， attention. An eminent French economist， M. de Molinari， published a proposal for what he called a League of Neutral Powers. The majority of civilised states are always neutral， though the neutrals are not always the same. If the neutrals combine they are irresistible， partly from their strength and partly from their power to make one of two belligerent Powers irresistible by joining its side. M. de Molinari's suggestion was that it should be one of the duties of neutrality to thwart the spirit of belligerency， to make it a rule that the outbreak of hostility between any two Powers should be a casus belli as regards the rest， and to embody these arrangements in the stipulations of a treaty. It is impossible to deny that if such a combination of neutral Powers could be effected under the suggested conditions it would be a most effectual safeguard against war， and this is in itself an ample justification for starting the proposal. But the objections to it are plain， and were at once advanced. If carried into effect， it might diminish the chances of war； but it takes for granted that the mechanism of war will remain unimpaired. If neutrals are to be equal to their new duties， they must maintain great armies and navies on the modern scale， or they may not be able to cope with the contemplated emergency. Thus， though the risk of war might be lessened， the burden of war would at best remain the same； there would be the same vast unproductive expenditure， the same ruinous displacement of industry One result of the scheme might， in fact， defeat another. It is not altogether true in civil affairs that the strong man armed keeps his house in peace. The fact that he wears full armour is sometimes a source of quarrelsomeness， and a temptation to attack his neighbours.

　　The scheme of H. de

Molinari failed to command the attention and interest which were essential to its serious consideration， because it was too large and ambitious. It was nevertheless founded， as it appears to me， on a correct principle， that， if war is ever to be arrested， it will be arrested by sacrifices on the part of those states which are neither at war nor desire to go to war. There is a very ancient example of this method of arresting and preventing the spread of war. Just before the dawn of Greek history， eve have a glimpse of the existence of several combinations of Greek tribes （which as yet can scarcely be called states） for the purpose of preventing war among themselves and resisting attacks from outside. Of these 'amphiktiones，' alliances of neighbouring communities clustered round a temple as a sanctuary， one only constituted on a respectable scale survived to historical time， evidently in a state of decay， and liable to become the tool of any aggressive military Power， but still even then greatly venerated. Now let us look around the world of our day， and try to see whether we can find anywhere an example of a successful amphiktiony， a combination of neighbouring Powers formed for the purpose of preventing wars.

　　I think we have seen for ten years or thereabouts a curiously similar alliance of the sort， framed for a similar purpose. I refer to the alliance of the three great sovereigns of Eastern Europe which is sometimes called the alliance of the three Emperors， which， however， they themselves do not admit to be in form more than a personal understanding. This alliance or understanding， if we may judge by the newspapers， is not particularly popular in Western Europe. Perhaps we do it the same injustice， and for the same reason， which as historical students we do to such great territorial aggregates as the Medo-Persian Empire under the Great King. Political freedom and the movement which we call progress do not flourish in these vast territorial sovereignties， perhaps through some necessity of human nature； and thus we contrast them unfavourably with the Athenian Republic， the parent of art， science， and political liberty， or else with those modern societies to which we ourselves eminently belong. There is not much constitutionalism， as we understand the word， in Germany and Austro-Hungary， and there is none at all in Russia， and thus eve are led to forget the services they render to mankind by the maintenance of peace and the prevention of bloodshed.

　　I suppose that， of the causes of war which we know to exist in our day， there were never so many combined as in Eastern Europe during the last ten years. The antecedents of the three combined Emperors revere such as to threaten an outbreak of hostilities at any moment. Germany had ravaged a successful war against Austria， and also had inflicted bitter humiliation on France， till the other day the most powerful military state in Europe. Russia in 1877-8 had been at war with the Turkish Empire， which， though in the greatest decrepitude， exercised a nominal sovereignty over nearly all of Eastern Europe which was not included in the dominions of the allied sovereigns. Among the small communities which were broken fragments of this Empire， the modern springs of war were in perpetual activity. The spirit of ambition， the spirit of religious antagonism， the spirit of race combination or of nationality （whatever it has to be called）， were all loose. Nevertheless， under these menacing conditions， the 'amphiktiony' of the three Empires preserved the peace. We do not know what were the exact terms of the understanding， nor do we quite know when it began. There are signs of something like it having existed before the Treaty of Berlin in 1878； and though it has to contend with many difficulties （at this moment with one most dangerous in Bulgaria）， it is still said to exist. We cannot doubt what the main heads of the understanding must be. The three Emperors must have agreed t

o keep the peace among themselves， to resist the solicitations of external Powers， and to forget many of their own recollections. They must have aimed at keeping the quarrelsome little communities about them to the limits assigned to them by the Berlin Treaty. They have not absolutely succeeded in this； but， considering the difficulties， the success of the alliance has been conspicuous.

　　The precedent is one on which anyone who shares the hopes of the founder of this Professorship is forced to set the greatest store. It has been shown that a limited number of states， by isolating a limited group of questions， and agreeing to do their best （if necessary， by force） to prevent these questions from kindling the fire of belligerency， may preserve peace in a part of the world which seemed threatened by imminent war. It is not a very large experiment， but it has demanded sacrifices both of money and sentiment. It points to a method of abating war which in our day is novel， but which， after having had for about ten years the sanction of one precedent， is now in course of obtaining the sanction of another. For the alliance of the three Emperors is about to be succeeded by the combination of the Austro-Hungarian and German Governments with the Government of Italy. If， then， for periods of ten years together， one community or more， eager for war， can be prevented from engaging in it， one long step will have been taken towards the establishment of that permanent universal peace which has been hitherto a dream.

　　War is too huge and too ancient an evil for there to be much probability that it will submit to any one or any isolated panacea. I would even say that there is a strong presumption against any system

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