亨利-梅因：国际法Lecture 6

egards most of the world. But the United States decline the new neutral immunities because they will not surrender privateering. Now in any new war an attempt to enforce the parts of law unfavourable to neutrals， will probably turn the neutral trading community into a belligerent， and the power of employing its own and foreign ships as privateers would make the American Union a very formidable belligerent. The question is， whether it is worth while amending the Declaration of Paris， and making it of universal application by accepting the further reforms proposed by the United States； that is， by exempting all private property from capture， and by abolishing privateering.

　　Let us first ask ourselves： what is supposed to be the object in war of subjecting the property of an enemy to capture， either in his own ships or in neutral bottoms？ It does not directly benefit the country carrying out the law， because under modern practice a vessel properly captured belongs， not to the State， but to the captors. The assumption is that it distresses the enemy， that it enfeebles his trade， and raises greatly the price of many luxuries and commodities， and， more than all， that it seriously diminishes his capital. It is here to be observed that the view of maritime law taken， even by international lawyers， does not quite answer to the truth A metaphor used in the last century was that the operations of maritime war resembled a flight of carrier pigeons pursued by a flight of hawks. But he who would repeat this figure would have to forget the enormous growth of the practice of maritime insurance. It may happen as to war risks as with insurance against perils of the sea， that a capture of as man's vessel， if prudently managed， may enrich rather than impoverish him. No doubt enhanced rates of insurance do impoverish a nation， and do diminish its capital. But the loss is widely diffused， it falls on the well-to-do class， and a war must be very protracted in which increase of marine insurance would be sensibly felt by the mass of the population.

　　Another g

eneral position may be noticed. In a war in which aggression is kept on the old footing by the powers of armament which privateering gives， the Power which has most property at sea is most injured. The old law took for granted the equality not only of naval strength among states， but in volume of trade and of property risked. To the amount of risk the amount of loss will always correspond. The question，therefore， arises： what interest have we， what interest has Great Britain， in refusing to grant a general immunity from capture to all private property at sea？ In the first place， so far as trade is conducted by maritime conveyance， this country has incomparably the largest share in it. This is in great part a consequence of a revolution in shipbuilding. So long as ships were built of wood， the maritime Powers were those which commanded most timber. The Baltic states， Russia， and the United States seemed likely to have in turn a monopoly of transport. The Dutch swept the world for timber adapted to maritime purposes. But now that ships of all classes are made of iron， the monopoly of construction and possession has passed to Great Britain. We are both the constructors and the carriers of the world， and we suffer more than any other community from all dangers， interruptions， and annoyances which beset maritime carriage.

　　But far the most serious consideration affecting the matter before us —— that is， the conformity of the Declaration of Paris to our permanent interests —— is the relation of maritime law， which it sets up， to the supply of food. The statesmen of the last century， and of the first part of this， unhesitatingly assumed that it was the interest of this country to raise the largest part of the food of its population from British soil. They were used to wars， and the great French war seemed to them to establish that a country not fed by the produce of its own soil might be reduced to the greatest straits. In fact， the price of corn during the great French war， and even for some years following it， was absolutely prodigious. This is the secret of their protectionism， and not any particular economical theory. They looked on the evils of importing food from abroad as a clear deduction from experience. Since that period， the infrequency of wars has kept out of sight the unexampled nature of our position with regard to food. So far as the articles most necessary to life are concerned， we are mainly fed from other countries， removed from us by vast distances from North America and from India； that is to say， a great part of the national food before reaching us is only accessible to us through maritime carriage， very long and capable of very easy interruption. Sir James Caird， in a paper which he has recently published， says that the food imported into Great Britain during the year 1887 would probably reach one hundred and forty millions sterling. Nor can the balance between foreign commodities and home supplies be seriously altered. Sir James Caird points out in the same paper that Great Britain is steadily becoming a pastoral country instead of an agricultural country. The state of living under any circumstances is at all times very hard to alter； and population， at various degrees of pace， always multiplies up to subsistence. On the other hand， the price which we pay for our prodigious purchase of food in other countries is really paid by our manufactures， of which the ultimate sources are our coal and our iron， and the inherited skill of our operative classes. Thus the greater part of the food which we consume in any year can only reach us through a long voyage， and the price which is the means of bringing it to us must also come through a voyage of equal length. These， of course， are economical reasons， but I also look on the subject from the point of view of International Law. Unless wars must be altogether discarded as certain never again to recur， our situation is one of unexampled danger. Some part of the su

pplies which are matter of life and death to us may be brought to us as neutral cargo with less difficulty than before the Declaration of Paris was issued， but a nation still permitted to employ privateers can interrupt and endanger our supplies at a great number of points， and so can any nation with a maritime force of which any material portion can be detached for predatory cruising. It seems， then， that the proposal of the American Government to give up privateers on condition of exempting all private property from capture， might well be made by some very strong friend of Great Britain. If universally adopted， it would save our food， and it would save the commodities which are the price of our food， from their most formidable enemies， and would disarm the most formidable class of those enemies.

　　Of course I am aware of the objections which might be made. It may be asked whether it would tend to diminish wars if economical loss were reduced to the lowest point， and if hostility between nations resolved itself into a battle of armed champions， of ironclads and trained armies， if war were to be something like the contests between the Italian States in the Middle Ages， conducted by free companies in the pay of this or that community. I think that， even thus modified， war would be greatly abated. But this is a subject which ought not to be taken for granted without discussion， and I hope in some future lecture to take it up and go into it completely

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